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Abstract. The paper studies problems of satisfiability, decidability and
admissibility of inference rules, conceptions of knowledge and agent’s
knowledge in non-transitive temporal linear logic LTLPast,m. We find
algorithms solving mentioned problems, justify our approach to con-
sider linear non-transitive time with several examples. Main, most com-
plicated, technical new result is it decidability of LTLPast,m w.r.t.
admissible rules. We discuss several ways to formalize conceptions of
knowledge and agent’s knowledge within given approach in non-transitive
linear logic with models directed to past.
Keywords: temporal logic, non-transitive accessibility relations, knowledge,
parameterized knowledge operations, satisfiability, admissible rules, deciding
algorithms
1 Introduction
No question that there is no more interesting and mysterious object as concep-
tion of time. But nowadays it works fine in prose of the life – for example, it
has many interpretations in CS (eg. for interpretation of spread the set of check
points in computational runs, etc.). Historically, investigations of temporal logic
in mathematical/philosophical logic based at modal systems was originated by
Arthur Prior in the late 1950s. Since then temporal logic has been (and is) very
active area in mathematical logic and information sciences, AI and CS (cf. eg.
– Gabbay and Hodkinson[9,10,11]). It was observed that temporal logic has im-
portant applications in formal verification, where it is used to state requirements
of hardware or software systems.
In particular, linear temporal logic LTL (with Until and Next) is very useful
instrument(cf. Manna, Pnueli [26,27], Vardi [45,46]) (LTL was used for ana-
lyzing protocols of computations, check of consistency, etc.). The decidability
and satisfiability problems for LTL, so to say main problems, were in focus of
investigations and were successfully resolved (cf. references above).
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The conception of knowledge, and especially the one implemented via multi-
agent approach is a popular area in Logic in Computer Science. Various aspects
including interaction and autonomy, effects of cooperation etc were investigated
(cf. eg. Woldridge et al [48,49,50], Lomuscio et al [25,3]). In particular, a multi-
agent logic with distances were studied and satisfiability problem for it was
solved (Rybakov et al [41]); conception of Chance Discovery in multi-agent’s
environment was considered (Rybakov [42,43]); a logic modeling uncertainty via
agent’s views was investigated (cf. McLean et al [28]); representation of agents
interaction (as a dual of common knowledge) was suggested in Rybakov [39,38].
Conception of refined common knowledge was suggested in Rybakov [33].
Historically the conception of common knowledge was formalized and profoundly
analyzed in 1990x, cf. eg. Fagin et al [7], using as a base agent’s knowledge (S5-
like) modalities. The approach to model knowledge in terms of symbolic logic,
probably, may be dated to the end of 1950. At 1962 Hintikka [13] wrote the book:
Knowledge and Belief, the first book-length work to suggest using modalities to
capture the semantics of knowledge.
In contemporary study, the field of knowledge representation and reasoning
in logical terms is very wide and active area. Frequently modal and multi-modal
logics were used for formalizing agent’s reasoning. Such logics were, in particular,
suggested in Balbiani et al [6], Vakarelov [47], Fagin et al [7], Rybakov [33,38].
The book Fagin et al [7] contains summarized to that time systematic approach
to study the notion of common knowledge. Some contemporary study of knowl-
edge and believes in terms of single-modal logic may be found in Halpern et al
[12]. Modern approach to knowledge frequently uses conception of justification
in terms of epistemic logic (cf. eg. Atremov et al [1,2], Halpern [12]). We will
suggest some views on knowledge and knowledge in terms of multi-agent logic
being based at refined version of linear temporal logic LTL. We will need some
technique borrowed from tools for verification of admissibility for inference rules.
The problem of admissibility for inference rules and unifiability problem were
already addressed to linear temporal logic. The admissibility problem (to de-
termine for any given rule if this rule is admissible for a given logic) was in
focus of interest for many logicians. Active research in the area may be dated
to Harvey Friedman problem [8]: if there is an algorithm of verification for ad-
missibility in the intuitionistic propositional logic IPC (this problem was first
solved by Rybakov in 1984, [29]). Since then many logicians were interested
to study admissibility from various viewpoints and in many logical systems re-
lated to non-classical propositional logics (cf. V. Rybakov [30,31,32,35,36,37], Ry-
bakov, et al [4,5], R. Iemhoff [14,15], R. Iemhoff and G. Metcalfe [16], E. Jerabek
[18,21,19,17]); prime questions were recognizing admissibility, study of bases for
inference rules. Only a necessary condition for admissibility of inference rules
in the branching-time temporal logic TS4 was found in [40], though for linear
temporal logic LTL the problem was solved in full [37]. Complexity problem for
admissibility in intuitionistic logic and some modal logics was first studied and
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Effective approach to study admissible rules was offered by S. Ghilardi via
unification technique; at ([23], 1999) it was first found and algorithm writing out
a complete set of unifiers for any unifiable in IPC formula, and this gives another
solution for admissibility problem. Since then, unification in propositional modal
logics over K4 was extensively studied by S. Ghilardi [23,24,22]. He developed a
novel method, based on Lo¨wenheim approach, which has proved to be also useful
in dealing with admissibility and bases of admissible rules. In (Babenyshev and
Rybakov [4]) we found solution of the unification problem in the linear temporal
logic LTL. (the case of LTL with no Until was solved; the case of linear temporal
logic with future and past easy follows because we may model in this logic the
universal modality (cf. Rybakov [36])).
Our paper studies a non-transitive version of the linear temporal logic LTL
- the linear temporal logic LTLPast,m based at non-transitive linear frames.
We consider the frames diverted to past and since that we as the basic opera-
tion Since instead of Until. Based at the property of operation Since (to keep
truth values of a statements since a specified property happened to be true) we
define a conception to be knowledge in several possible ways including parameter-
ized knowledge and knowledge via agent’s viewpoint, including voting, preceding
events etc.. We find this to be very plausible and useful interpretation.
We begin form construction the logic LTLPast,m: we define its language, syn-
tax, semantic models. Then we shortly comment why these models look plausible
and give several examples. Next, we develop all necessary technical instruments,
including notion of valid inference rules, and reduced normal forms for infer-
ence rues. Based at this, we solve satisfiability and decidability problems for
LTLPast,m (these results similar to the ones submitted to a conference [44], for
the case non-uniform bounds of intransitivity). Then we approach to the main
problem solved in this paper: we show that LTLPast,m is decidable w.r.t. ad-
missible rules and we find an algorithm solving admissibility problem. This is
the main (and most complicated) new technical result of this paper. We, in the
concluding part, comment how this approach might be used in interpretation
of logical knowledge and agent’s knowledge operations. The paper is about self
contained and use only technique which is explained and defined here (proofs
however due to length are usually omitted).
2 Necessary preliminary information
We will base our approach at a new non-transitive version of the linear tem-
poral logic LTL (motivation for non-transitivity will be given at short separate
section below). Therefore we start from a sort recall of notation and defini-
tions concerning LTL . The language of the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL in the
sequel) extends the language of Boolean logic by operations N (next) and U
(until). The formulas of LTL are built up from a set Prop of atomic proposi-
tions (synonymously - propositional letters) and are closed under applications of
Boolean operations, the unary operation N (next) and the binary operation U
(until). The formula Nϕ has meaning: the statement ϕ holds in the next time
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point (state); the formula ϕUψ means: ϕ holds until ψ will be true. Semantics
for LTL consists of infinite transition systems (runs, computations); formally
they are represented as linear Kripke structures based on natural numbers. The
infinite linear Kripke structure is a quadrupleM := 〈N ,≤,Next, V 〉, where N is
the set of all natural numbers; ≤ is the standard order on N , Next is the binary
relation, where a Next b means b is the number next to a. V is a valuation of a
subset S of Prop. Hence the valuation V assigns truth values to elements of S.
So, for any p ∈ S, V (p) ⊆ N , V (p) is the set of all n from N where p is true
(w.r.t. V ). All elements of N are called to be states (worlds), ≤ is the transition
relation (which is linear in our case), and V can be interpreted as labeling of the
states with atomic propositions. The triple 〈N ,≤,Next〉 is a Kripke frame which
we will denote for short by N .
The truth values in any Kripke structureM, can be extended from proposi-
tions of S to arbitrary formulas constructed from these propositions as follows:
Definition 1. Computational rules for logical operations:
– ∀p ∈ Prop (M, a) V p ⇔ a ∈ N ∧ a ∈ V (p);
– (M, a) V (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ (M, a) V ϕ ∧ (M, a) V ψ;
– (M, a) V ¬ϕ ⇔ not[(M, a) V ϕ];
– (M, a) VNϕ ⇔[ ∀b[(a Next b)⇒(M, b) V ϕ]];
– (M, a) V (ϕUψ) ⇔ ∃b[(a ≤ b) ∧ ((M, b) V ψ)∧
– ∀c[(a ≤ c < b) ⇒ (M, c) V ϕ]].
For a Kripke structure M := 〈N ,≤,Next, V 〉 and a formula ϕ with letters
from the domain of V , we say ϕ is valid inM (denotation –M ϕ) if, for any
b of M (b ∈ N ), the formula ϕ is true at b (denotation: (M, b) V ϕ).
The linear temporal logic LTL is the set of all formulas which are valid in all
infinite temporal linear Kripke structures M based on N with standard ≤ and
Next. Now we will modify the models for the ones with non-transitive time.
3 Possible words models with non-transitive time
Our approach will need a dual of LTL – the logic with since operation. Actually
we may interpret this dual is as a standard LTL, but with time diverted to past,
and yet based at non-transitive models. We may introduce this dual as follows.
The formulas are constructed as earlier, but with the binary logical operation S
(since) instead of U (until).
The frame N− is 〈N,≥,Next〉, and V as before is a valuation of a subset S
of Prop on the set N . So, we take the language of LTL, delete U and replace
it with the binary operation S. The definition of the truth relation for S is as
follows:
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(N−, a) V (ϕSψ) ⇔∃b[(b ≥ a) ∧ ((N
−, b) V ψ)∧
∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(N−, c) V ϕ]].
So, S is just the dual ofU (and note that it acts exactly asU, we simply interpret
it to past). Operation Next (notation N) will act as earlier, but again directed
to the past, next one means next in past. That is
(N−, a) VNϕ ⇔ (N
−, a+ 1) V ϕ.
(We will not use standard notation for LTL with until because it will break our
approach to model knowledge in later part in this paper.)
Definition 2. A non-transitive possible-worlds linear frames with uni-
form non-transitivity (which upon we will base our approach) is a freame:
F := 〈N,≥,Next,
⋃
i∈N
Ri〉,
where each Ri is the standard linear order (≥) on the interval [i, i +m], where
m is a fixed natural number (measure of intransitivity).
For any set of letters P we may define an arbitrary valuation V on F in
standard way, and F with a valuation is called a modelM. Thus, for any p ∈ P ,
we have V (p) ⊆ N and we may extend V to all boolean formulas built up from
P as usual. The same way as earlier we define truth values for formulas of kind
Nϕ. But for formulas ϕSψ the definition is new one:
Definition 3. Computation rule for weak bounded since:
(M, a) V (ϕ S ψ) ⇔
∃b[(bRaa) ∧ ((M, b) V ψ) ∧ ∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(M, c) V ϕ]].
Definition 4. The logic LTLPast,m is the set of all formulas which are valid at
any model M with the measre of intransitivity m.
The relation
⋃
i∈N Ri is evidently non-transitive and right now we will explain
why this approach to time is accepted. Just to immediately comment, briefly note
that S works similar to usual U (but only within the stet of states accessible
from the current one, – since our accessibility relations are non-transitive); and
yet it acts as Since regarding our definition of the time accessibility relation
directed to past.
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4 Why we consider that time might be non-transitive
The approach described above considers the time directed to past (which, so to
say, relays to our memory about past). Computationally (form CS viewpoint),
we analyze the behavior of a computation, computational runs, being given by
protocols of events which happened (already happened) while computation.
View (i). Computations view. Inspections of protocols for computations are
limited by time resources and have non-uniform length. Therefore, if we interpret
our models as the ones reflecting inspection of protocols for computation, the
amount of check points is finite. In any point of inspection we may refer to
stored protocols, and any one has limited length. Thus the inspections look as
non-transitive accessibility relations.
View (ii). Agent’s-admin’s view. We may consider states (worlds of our
model) as checkpoints of admins (agents) for any inspection of state of network in
past. Any admin has allowed amount of inspections for previous states, but only
within the areas of its(his/her) responsibility (by security or another reasons).
So, the accessibility is not transitive again, the admin (a1) can reach a state,
and there in, the admin (a2) responsible for this state (it may be a new one or
the same yet), has again some allowed amount of inspections to past. But, in
total, (a1) cannot inspect all states accessible for (a2).
View (iii). Agent’s-users’s view. If we consider the sates of the models as the
content of web pages admissible for users, any surf step is accessibility relation,
and starting from any web page user may achieve, using links in hypertext(s)
some foremost available web site. The latter one may have web links which are
available only for individuals possessing passwords for accessibility. And these
one (having password) may continue web surf, etc. Clearly that in this approach,
web surfing looks as non-transitive relation. Here we interpret web surf as time,
but diverted to past, instead of opposite. The models suggested above again
serve well these approach.
View (iv). View on time in past for collecting knowledge. In human percep-
tion, the some finite time in past (not in future) is only available to individuals
to inspect evens and knowledge collected to current time state. The time is past
in our feelings looks as linear, and, as an individual, the same as mankind in
total, have finite amount of memory to remember information and events. There,
in past, at foremost available (memorable) time point, individuals again had a
memorable interval of time with collected information. And so forth... So, the
time in past for mankind overall is not transitive.
View (v). View in past for individuals as agents with opposition. Here the
picture is similar to the case (iv) above, but we may consider the knowledge as
the collection of facts which about majority experts (agents) have affirmative
positive opinion. And, in past time, the voted opinion of experts about facts
could be different at distinct time points, Besides the time intervals memorable
by experts might be very variative in past. Therefore in this approach time
nohow may look transitive.
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5 Satisfiability, decidability, admissible rules,
computation algorithms,
Since we introduced a sensibly innovated linear temporal logic (modification of
LTL, a very popular in CS logic), which is non-transitive, we would like to address
first to this logic basic computational problems for any logic: satisfiability and
decidability problems. It is immediately seen that the old standard techniques
to solve these problems do not work because the accessibility relation is not
transitive. Therefore the standard technique of rarefication as eg. at [39,38] or
direct usage of automatons technique do not work here. If we would try to
use some variants of filtration technique than a technical obstacle is possible
nested operations S and non-transitivity again: how we would define accessibility
relations Ri then.
Therefore we will need some preliminary work to avoid nested operations. In
fact we will be based on a modernization of the technique used already, eg. in
[39], Most gain from this approach is that we will then consider only very simple
and uniform formulas which are formulas without nested temporal operations.
For this, we will need a transformation of formulas into rules in reduced form.
Recall that a (sequential) (inference) rule is an expression (statement)
r :=
ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕl(x1, . . . , xn)
ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
,
where ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕl(x1, . . . , xn) and ψ(x1, . . . , xn) are formulas con-
structed out of letters x1, . . . , xn. The letters x1, . . . , xn are the variables of
r, we use the notation xi ∈ V ar(r). A meaning of a rule r is that the statement
(formula) ψ(x1, . . . , xn) (which is called conclusion) follows (logically follows)
from statements (formulas) ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕl(x1, . . . , xn) which are called
premisses.
Definition 5. A rule r is said to be valid in a model 〈M, V 〉 (we will use the
notation M V r) if
[∀a ((M, a) V
∧
1≤i≤l
ϕi)]⇒ [∀a ((M, a) V ψ)].
Otherwise we say r is refuted in M, or refuted inM by V , and write M  V r.
A rule r is valid in a frame M (notation M r) if, for any valuation V , the
following holds M V r.
For any formula ϕ, we can transform ϕ into the rule x→ x/ϕ and employ a
technique of reduced normal forms for inference rules as follows.
Lemma 1. For any formula ϕ, ϕ is a theorem of LTLPast,m iff the rule (x→ x/ϕ)
is valid in any frame M .
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Definition 6. A rule r is said to be in reduced normal form if r = ε/x1 where
ε :=
∨
1≤j≤l
[
∧
1≤i≤n
x
t(j,i,0)
i ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
(Nxi)
t(j,i,1) ∧
∧
1≤i,k≤n,i6=k
(xiSxk)
t(j,i,k,1)]
and, for any formula α above, α0 := α, α1 := ¬α.
Definition 7. Given a rule rnf in reduced normal form, rnf is said to be a
normal reduced form for a rule r iff, for any frame F for LTLPast,m,
M r ⇔M rnf .
Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm running in (single) exponential time,
which, for any given rule r, constructs its normal reduced form rnf .
Now we need we need special finite frames F(N−,m) having the structure
resembling the structure of frames F but not linear discrete ones (which are not
the frames which we used to define LTLPast,m). We have no space to define their
structure explicitly due to paper space limitation. Note only that the accessibility
relations at frames F(N−,m) are non-transitive and with measure of transitivity
m also.
Lemma 2. For any given rule rnf in reduced normal form, rnf is refuted in a
frame of F iff rnf can be refuted in some finite frame F(N
−,m) by a valuation
V , where the size of the frame F(N−,m) has size effectively computable from
the size of rnf .
It is clear that a formula ϕ is satisfiable (ϕ is true at a state of a model
for LTLPast) if and only if ¬ϕ 6∈ LTLPast,m. Therefore based at Theorem 1,
Lemma 1 and Lemma 5 we may prove:
Theorem 2. The logic LTLPast,m is decidable; the satisfiability problem for
the non-transitive linear temporal logic LTLPast,m is decidable: for any formula
we can compute if it is satisfiable and to compute the valuation of the model
satisfying this formula.
The computational algorithm, in its final stage, consists of definition a com-
putable valuation in some initial part of N which finally is resulted in a total
valuation satisfying the formula. Now on we have enough technique to proceed
to admissibility of inference rules.
Definition 8. An inference rule
r := ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕl(x1, . . . , xn)/ψ(x1, . . . , xn), is said to be
admissible in a logic L if, for any tuple of formulas α1, . . . , αn, the following
holds [
∧
1≤i≤l ϕi(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ L] ⇒ [ψ(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ L].
Thus, for any admissible rule, any instance into the premises making all of
them theorems of a logic L makes also the conclusion to be a theorem. Using
the same algorithm of construction reduced normal form rnf for any given rule
r as at Theorem 1 we may obtain
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Lemma 3. For any given rule r, r is admissible in LTLPast,m iff rnf is admis-
sible in LTLPast,m .
Next necessary for our approach result is the following statement:
Lemma 4. For any given rule rnf in reduced normal form, rnf is not admissible
in the logic LTLPast if and only if rnf is refuted in a special finite frame by
a valuation V possessing some special properties (and the size of the this
frame, as earlier, has an effective bound computable from the size of rnf ).
Based at Lemmas 3 and 4 we obtain
Theorem 3. The logic LTLPast,m is decidable w.r.t. admissible rules. There is
an algorithm verifying for any given inference rule if it is admissible in LTLPast,m.
It is good time to give examples admissible for LTLPast,m but invalid rules.
For example the rules
Nx/x, Nx1 → Nx2/x1 → x2, Nx1 U Nx2/x1Ux2
are admissible but invalid in LTLPast,m. This is because
Theorem 4. If ϕ(p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm) is an arbitrary boolean formula con-
structed from propositional letters p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm, then the rule
ϕ(Nx1, . . . ,Nxn,Ny1UNz1 . . . ,NymUNzm)
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, y1Uz1 . . . , ymUzm))
is admissible in LTLPast,m
We may show it exactly the same way as it was proved for the logic LTL
itself in [37]. This theorem gives an infinite set of admissible in LTLPast,m rules,
were some infinite part of this set consists of rules invalid in LTLPast,m. Actually
these rules alow to withdraw operation N from formulas of the premisses.
It is clear that ✷x→ ✷✷x ∈ LTL but ✷x→ ✷✷x /∈ LTLPast,m. Thus, we
immediately see, there are admissible in LTL rules which are not admissible in
LTLPast,m. However even vise versa,
Theorem 5. There are not passive inference rules (which means their premisses
are unifiable) which are admissible in LTLPast,m but not admissible in LTL.
This statement is already not immediate or trivial. Thus non-transitive temporal
linear logics LTL and LTLPast,m differ w.r.t. admissible inference rules: no one
set is enclosed into the another one.
Now we would like to comment the case of temporal linear non-transitive
logic with non-uniform bound of intransitivity. We reported about this logic in
[44]. Just to recall the definition and results,
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Definition 9. A non-transitive possible-worlds frame is
M := 〈N,≥,Next,
⋃
i∈N
Ri〉,
where each Ri is the standard linear order (≥) on the interval [i,mi], where
mi ∈ N,mi > i and mi+1 > mi.
Again as earlier we may define a model M on F by introducing a valuation
V on F and extend it on all formulas as earlier. In particular, for formulas ϕSψ:
Definition 10. Computation rule for weak, non-unform since:
(M, a) V (ϕ S ψ) ⇔
∃b[(bRaa) ∧ ((M, b) V ψ) ∧ ∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(M, c) V ϕ]].
Definition 11. The logic LTLPast is the set of all formulas which are valid at
any model M with any valuation.
The relation
⋃
i∈N Ri is again non-transitive and the bounds non-transitivity
in frames is arbitrary, - non-uniform. Using an approach similar to the one used
in this paper above we stated the following:
Lemma 5. For any given rule rnf in reduced normal form, rnf is refuted in a
frame of F iff rnf can be refuted in some finite frame F(N
−) by a valuation V ,
where the size of the frame F(N−) has size effectively computable from the size
of rnf .
And based at this we deducted:
Theorem 6. [44] The logic LTLPast is decidable; the satisfiability problem for
the non-transitive linear temporal logic LTLPast is decidable: for any formula
we can compute if it is satisfiable and to compute the valuation of the model
satisfying this formula.
But at [44] we were not able to solve in LTLPast the problem of admissibility
for inference rules. Here we solved admissibility problem for LTLPast,m, but the
presence of uniform bound m for non-transitivity was impotent and necessary
to develop indispensable technique.
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6 Applications: knowledge of agent’s
In this section we would like to describe applications of our technique and ob-
tained results for formalization the conception of knowledge in logical terms (we
commented at the introduction, that there is a extensive research devoted to
study knowledge in logical framework, and – especially epistemic modal logic;
here we would suggest somewhat natural and simple, but anyway it seems new).
We start from a trivial statement that knowledge is not absolute and depends
on opinions of individuals (agents) who accept a statement as safely true or not.
Yet, it is not unequally defined what we actually, in fact, consider as knowledge.
First, would like to look at it via temporal perspective. Some evident trivial
observations are that
(i) Human beings remember (at least some) past, but
(ii) they do not know future at all (rather could surmise what will happen in
immediate proximity time steps);
(iii) individual memory tells to us that the time in past was linear
(though it might be only our perception).
Therefore it looks meaningful to look for the interpretation of knowledge in
past linear temporal logic - LTLPast. Here below we will use the unary logical
operations Ki with meaning - it is a knowledge operation. So, Kiϕ says that the
statement ϕ is knowledge.
(i) approach: when knowledge holds stable:
(N−, a) VK1ϕ ⇔ ∃b[(b ≥ a) ∧ ((N
−, b) V ϕ)∧
∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(N−, c) V ϕ].
That is
(N−, a) VK1ϕ ⇔ (N
−, a) V ϕSϕ.
This is an unusual but rather plausible interpretation. In time being, we say
that ϕ is a knowledge if one day in past it happened and since then is true
until now, today. The only disturbing point here is that b could be equal a -
so, b is today, so then knowledge has very sort time support... Therefore such
interpretation yet needs a refining.
(ii) approach: knowledge if always was true:
(N−, a) VK2ϕ ⇔ (N
−, a) V ¬(⊤S¬ϕ).
This is close to standard interpretation in epistemic logic offered quit a while
ago: we consider a fact to be knowledge if it has been true always (in our approach
– in past).
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(iii) approach: via parameterized knowledge:
(N−, a) VKψϕ ⇔ (N
−, a) V ϕSψ.
This means ϕ has a stable value true, – since some event happened in past,
which is modeled now by ψ to be true at a state. Thus, as soon as ψ happened to
be true, ϕ always has been true until now. Clearly this approach generalizes first
two suggested above and yet it is more flexible. From technical standpoint we
just use standard Since operation of the linear temporal logic LTL but diverted
to past. This approach is looking very natural; it gives new view angle on the
problem and yet uses some respectful and well established technique.
(iv) approach: via agents knowledge as voted truth for
the valuation:
This is very well established area, cf. the book Fagin et al [7] and more
contemporary publications e.g. - Rybakov [33,38]. Though here we would like
to look at it from an another standpoint. Earlier logical knowledge operations
(agents knowledge) were just unary logical operations Ki interpreted as S5-
modalities, and knowledge operations were introduced via the vote of agents
about truth the statement, etc. We would like to suggest here somewhat very
simple, but it seems natural and new.
Here, in order to implement multi-agent’s framework we assume that all
agents have theirs own valuations at the frame N−. So, we have n much agents,
and n-much valuations Vi, and as earlier the truth values w.r.t. Vi of any propo-
sitional letter pj at any world a ∈ N . For applications viewpoint, Vi correspond
to agents information about truth of pj (they may be different). So, Vi is just
individual information .
How the information can be turned to local knowledge? One way is the voted
value of truth: we consider a new valuation V , w.r.t. which letters pj are true at
a if majority, biggest part (which one is negotiable) of agents, believes that pj is
true at a. Then we achieve a model with a single (standard) valuation V . Then
we can apply any of proposed upper approaches to introduce, so to say, logical
operations of global knowledge K. If we accept it, our technique works and we
may compute true laws of for statements about knowledge logical operations.
(v) approach: via agents knowledge as conflict resolution:
at evaluating point
Here we suggest a way starting similar as in the case (iv) above until intro-
duction of different valuations Vi of agent’s opinion. But then we suggest
(N−, a) VKψϕ ⇔ ∀i[(N
−, a) ViKψϕ].
In this case, if we will allow nested knowledge operations together with sev-
eral valuations Vi for agent’s information and yet derivative valuation V for all
cases when we evaluate Kψϕ (regardless for which agent (i.e. Vi)), no decision
procedure is known, and our technique does not work. We think that to solve
this open problem it is an interesting open question.
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7 Open problems
There are many remaining open interesting problems in our suggested frame-
work. E.g.the problem described at the final part of Section 6 (approach (v))
for multi-agent case. Yet one more open interesting question is to extend the
suggested approach to linear logic based at all integer numbers Z (which means
we have potentially infinite past and infinite future). Then the knowledge will
be interpret by a stable truth on reasonably long intervals of time in past and
future, so we will need to use both operations S and U. Next, it would be good
to study such approach to the case of continuous time (in past, or both - past
and future). Yet the case of admissibility problem for rules in LTLpast, as well
as the ones for rules with coefficients remain open.
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